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How Policy Changes Affect Shareholder Wealth: 
The Case of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster
* 
 
This paper analyzes how policy changes affect shareholder wealth in the context of 
environmental regulation. We exploit the unique and unexpected German reaction to the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, which involved the immediate shutdown of almost half of 
Germany’s nuclear reactors while safety checks were carried out, and a three-month 
moratorium on extending the lives of others. Using the event study methodology, our findings 
indicate a wealth transfer from nuclear energy companies to renewable energies companies 
in Germany. We moreover find that the joint market capitalization of these firms has 
decreased, but the amount of this combined decrease is small. Substantial heterogeneity in 
the shareholder wealth effects across European countries can be linked to different nuclear 
energy policies. The shareholder wealth of nuclear and conventional energy companies in 
the United States has been unaffected. 
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1 Introduction
Maybe the German Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel—who holds a doctorate in physical
(quantum) chemistry—had similar thoughts after the shocking events in Japan in
March 2011 as Albert Einstein had after the ﬁrst nuclear bomb hit Hiroshima. In any
case, she has clearly changed her mind at some point since 1998 when she wrote in
Science: “An honest consideration of our options indicates that we cannot afford to
discontinue peaceful use of nuclear energy” (Merkel, 1998). Such a change of her
mind would explain Germany’s unique and unexpected, but yet determined reaction
to Fukushima to immediately shutdown almost half of the country’s nuclear power
plants and to introduce a three-month moratorium on extending the lives of others.
The reaction marked yet another change in Germany’s nuclear policy; this time,
however, the change came overnight and without change of government.
The German reaction may appear very forceful and courageous—or even panic,
but it is nevertheless in line with a trend of “going green”. There is an increasing
move towards renewable energy in recent years, at least in the European Union.
Whereas non-binding targets had little effect, the directive 2009/28/EC for the pro-
motion of renewable energy includes binding goals which are to be reached in the
27 Member States by 2020 (European Union, 2009). Yet, about 80% of the energy
production in the EU comes from conventional sources of energy and about 14%
from nuclear energy (Diekmann, 2009).
Despite this trend towards renewable energy, and despite all political efforts,
there is a fundamental debate and a growing literature about the actual costs and
beneﬁts of “going green.” The trade-off between environment and competitiveness
is at the core of this debate (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Palmer et al., 1995).
However, the underlying question whether environmental regulation might actually
promote growth has not been answered satisfactorily yet.1 There is some consensus
in the literature that the relationship between economic growth and environmental
quality is inversely U-shaped. For example, Grossman and Krueger (1995) analyze
indicators of air and water quality in a cross section of countries and ﬁnd that after an
initial phase of deterioration, economic growth is followed by a subsequent phase
of improvement in environmental quality. But there is also evidence for a large
heterogeneity across countries.2
1See, e.g., Brock and Taylor (2005) for a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on the
relationship between economic growth and the environment.
2See, e.g., Choi et al. (2010) who study the relationship between carbon dioxide emissions and
1The dramatic and shocking events that took place in Japan in March 2011
provide us with the opportunity to shed further light on the question whether envi-
ronmental regulation might promote economic growth. We exploit the unique and
unexpected German reaction to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, which in-
volved the immediate shutdown of almost half of Germany’s nuclear power plants
while safety checks were carried out, and a three-month moratorium on extending
the lives of others. Only a couple of months earlier the same government had re-
verted the shutdown strategy of previous governments. We expect that the reversal
of nuclear policy affects German energy companies differently. Whereas nuclear en-
ergy companies can be expected to lose shareholder wealth, companies in the “green
economy” supposedly gain from this decision. We are able to compare the magnitude
of these two effects. We also investigate the shareholder wealth effects on European
energy companies, and more speciﬁcally on competitors in France, Italy, Switzerland
and Austria. These ﬁrms may on the one hand be affected by the German reaction
(e.g., as potential suppliers of electricity to Germany); on the other hand, they may
be affected by their own country’s reaction—if there was a policy change.
The earthquake and the subsequent tsunami hit Japan unexpectedly, and sim-
ilarly unexpected was the reaction of the German government to these events. This
allows us to apply a methodology which is typically used in the ﬁnance literature.
Using the event study approach, we measure the impact of the German reaction on
shareholder wealth of energy companies in different sectors. There are a few stud-
ies in the ﬁnance literature assessing the effects of nuclear disasters on stock prices,
such as the impact of the incident at Three Mile Island in March 1979 (Bowen et al.,
1983; Hill and Schneeweis, 1983), of the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 (Fields
and Janjigian, 1989; Kalra et al., 1993), and also of the recent accident in Japan
(Ferstl et al., 2011). However, our paper focuses on the impact of policy changes in
response to the recent accident and speciﬁcally explores the unique German reac-
tion. The nuclear disaster is the exogenous trigger for any policy change. We also
add to the debate about the costs and beneﬁts of “going green.” This discussion
gains importance as renewable sources of energy appear more and more as a valu-
able alternative to conventional sources. Our paper is therefore, both in terms of
methodology and research question, related to Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011)
who assess the shareholder wealth effects of membership in voluntary environmental
programs. In terms of methodology, related applications of the event study approach
include Card and Krueger (1995) who assess the quantitative impacts of increases
in the minimum wage on employer proﬁts, Brown et al. (2004) who examine the
market effects of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 in the United States, and
Lin (2011) who measures the impact of immigration on employer proﬁts.3
economic growth (and openness) using time series data from China, Korea and Japan.
3See Snowberg et al. (2011), and references therein, for event studies in political economy.
2If markets respond rationally to new information and the stock market accu-
rately reﬂects the ﬁrms’ value, the event study approach provides a direct measure
of how shareholder wealth is affected by unanticipated interventions. Yet, “event
studies have even fallen out of favor in their traditional strongholds: economics and
ﬁnance” (Snowberg et al., 2011, p.1). The reasons for this decline include the choice
of the event window, the assignment of a prior probability, and the presence or ab-
sence of other confounding events (Snowberg et al., 2011). Our study, however, does
not suffer from any of these problems. On the contrary, we argue that Germany’s
reversal of nuclear policy is an ideal case to apply the event study methodology. Our
results appear robust to the choice of the event window and the prior probability
of our event was overwhelmingly judged as being zero. Furthermore, confounding
events that could eventually bias our ﬁndings are not very important because our
focus primarily lies on the immediate market responses.
Our results indicate that shareholder wealth has been signiﬁcantly affected by
the German reaction in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. We ﬁnd
the expected opposing effects on nuclear energy companies and companies in the
“green economy.” Whereas the cumulative average abnormal returns amount to
–3.50% in the German nuclear and conventional energy industry, the shareholder
wealth in the renewable energies sector has increased by 17.89% during the period
of 20 trading days after the earthquake in Japan. In terms of market capitalization,
these effects translate into a decrease of about A C 2.1 billion in the nuclear and con-
ventional energy industry, and a gain of roughly A C 1.9 billion for renewable energy
companies. When we investigate whether European ﬁrms in the same sectors out-
side Germany could beneﬁt from the German reaction, we ﬁnd cumulative average
abnormal returns of 0.71% in the European nuclear energy industry. This seems rel-
atively small, but in terms of market capitalization it corresponds to a non-negligible
increase of about A C 5.9 billion. Furthermore, we ﬁnd substantial heterogeneity in
the shareholder wealth effects across European countries which can be linked to
different nuclear energy policies and policy responses. For instance, we present ev-
idence for substantial wealth gains of Austrian conventional energy companies that
are likely caused by the German policy change.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
series of events in Japan and policy reactions in Europe in March 2011, which we
exploit in our analysis. We particularly emphasize the German reaction to these
events and argue that the reaction was both unique and unexpected. Against this
background, we derive hypotheses for our empirical analysis. Section 3 provides a
description of the event study methodology, of the data and our sample of ﬁrms, and
of our event period. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 investigates
the robustness of our results by analyzing the United States as a “placebo” test.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
32 Background: Fukushima and Beyond
This section describes the shocking events in Japan that took place in early March
2011 as well as the subsequent policy reactions in European countries. We empha-
size Germany’s reversal of its nuclear energy policy. We argue that this unexpected
policy change provides an ideal case to apply the event study methodology.
2.1 The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster in Japan
Japan was shaken by a major earthquake on March 11, 2011. When the 9.0 magni-
tude earthquake hit at 2:26pm, all three operating reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant went into automatic shutdown. The earthquake additionally
destroyed the external power supply of the plant, so emergency power generators
provided the electricity for the cooling system. When the subsequent tsunami hit the
Japanese east coast where the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is situated,
it took these backup generators and the operators had to switch to battery power.
External mobile power generators could not be connected. As pressure and temper-
ature levels kept rising, the Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan declared the nuclear
emergency status at 7:03pm. The Japanese government announced an evacuation
zone of 3 kilometers around the power plant at 9:00pm.
On March 12, 2011 at 7:55pm, the Japanese Prime Minister announced that
a hydrogen explosion had occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
The evacuation zone was extended to a radius of 20 kilometers around the power
plant. On March 13, 2011 excessive radiation levels were reported and ofﬁcials
were quoted that a nuclear meltdown could be underway at one of the reactors
and that a meltdown was “highly possible” at another (Washington Post, 2011). On
March 20, 2011 the Japanese government announced the permanent shutdown of
the the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
In sum, more than 80,000 people have been evacuated from around the power
plant. Radioactive materials have been detected in tap water as far away as Tokyo, as
well as in agricultural products. There was, however, no immediate policy reaction
in Japan. The Prime Minister only gradually changed his view. On July 13, 2011 he
said that Japan should reduce and eventually eliminate its dependence on nuclear
energy (New York Times, 2011).
2.2 The Unique and Unexpected German Reaction
Whereas there was no immediate policy reaction in Japan, the German government
announced only three days after the events in Japan to immediately shutdown al-
most half of the country’s nuclear power plants. The reaction marked yet another
4change in Germany’s nuclear policy. This time, however, it was not possible to antic-
ipate such a change. Our analysis explores the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
as the exogenous trigger for the unexpected policy change in Germany.
Germany’s energy policy has seen important changes in the attitudes towards
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Importantly, a shutdown strategy for Germany’s
nuclear reactors had already been enacted when the Atomic Energy Law (Atomge-
setz) came into force on January 1, 2002. The social democratic-green coalition of
Chancellor Gerhard Schr¨ oder had scheduled a stepwise phase-out of nuclear power
plants until 2022–2025.4 This shutdown strategy was basically reverted—or, more
precisely, it was delayed—on December 14, 2010 by the conservative-liberal coali-
tion of Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel. On that day, an amendment to the Atomic
Energy Law came into force which speciﬁed an extension of the life-span of nuclear
reactors by 12 years on average.5
Against this background, the government’s reaction to the shocking events in
Japan was unexpected and marked yet another change in Germany’s nuclear policy.
The German government announced on March 14, 2011 at 4:05pm the immediate
shutdown of almost half of Germany’s nuclear power plants while safety checks were
carried out, and a three-month moratorium on extending the lives of others. The
moratorium and the decision to shutdown seven of the country’s 17 nuclear reactors
(i.e., those reactors that that went online before 1981) were conﬁrmed in a press
conference on the next day after a meeting with the federal states’ governments.
After expert commissions had debated on these issues and had made recommenda-
tions, the German Parliament passed another amendment to the Atomic Energy Law
on June 30, 2011. According to this amendment, the country will phase all nuclear
reactors out by 2022 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011).
Germany’s energy market is dominated by four large energy suppliers: E.ON,
EnBW, RWE, and Vattenfall. These companies possess nearly 75% of all conventional
power plant capacity and most of the power grid (Traber et al., 2011). Furthermore,
all 17 nuclear power plants which were active before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster were operated by these four ﬁrms. We therefore expect a direct impact of
the German reaction on these companies’ shareholder wealth.
2.3 Reactions in Selected European Countries
We argue that Germany’s reaction to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster is unique
in international comparison. Only Switzerland’s reaction was relatively similar, but it
4Note that the Atomic Energy Law did not specify a precise end date. Based on calculations of a
usual operation period of 32 years, it speciﬁed how much energy a nuclear power plant was allowed
to produce before being closed down.
5The life-span of older reactors was extended by 8 years and that of younger reactors by 14 years.
5did not involve the immediate shutdown of existing nuclear reactors. The Swiss Fed-
eral Councillor Doris Leuthard announced on March 14, 2011 that plans for building
three additional nuclear reactors were stopped. Moreover, safety checks on the ex-
isting nuclear reactors were announced on that day.
In stark contrast, France did not reconsider its nuclear energy policy. On the
contrary, the country is still planning to expand its nuclear energy production. In
response to the German reaction, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy said on June
7, 2011: “The decision of the Germans? I’m not criticizing. (...) If they close their
plants, they must be replaced. We will be a candidate for selling them electricity...”
(China Daily, 2011). If investors share this view, French nuclear and conventional
energy companies may gain shareholder wealth in the aftermath of Germany’s re-
versal of its nuclear energy policy. France derives more than 75% of its electricity
from nuclear energy, and the country is the world’s largest net exporter of electricity.
Italy has no nuclear power plants. The country shutdown its last two nuclear
rectors after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. On March 24, 2011 the Council of Min-
isters of Italy approved a moratorium on the future construction of nuclear power
plants. These plans to reverse Italy’s policy and to re-engage in nuclear energy were
ultimately stopped by a referendum on June 13, 2011.
Similarly, Austria has no nuclear power plants. Since 1999, “nuclear-free Aus-
tria” is part of the country’s constitution. The share of renewable energies in Austria’s
energy production was 73.3% in 2009 (BMWFJ, 2011). However, Austria has been a
net importer of electricity—also from Germany. Austrian power plant operators were
nevertheless quoted that they expect increasing electricity prices after the German
reaction, and that this would lead to higher proﬁts and may also lead to the utiliza-
tion of previously unused power plant capacity (e.g., of gas-ﬁred power plants). If
investors share this view, Austrian energy companies may gain shareholder wealth
in the aftermath of Germany’s reversal of its nuclear energy policy.
2.4 Hypotheses on Shareholder Wealth Effects
In this section we derive hypotheses which are tested in our empirical analysis. These
hypotheses focus on the shareholder wealth effects of policy changes in reaction
to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Our main emphasize is on the German
reaction and its impact on German energy companies in different sectors as well as
on their European competitors.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis is that we expect a negative impact on Germany’s nuclear
energy companies. Germany’s reversal of its nuclear energy policy should ceteris
paribus be associated with lower future proﬁts of the four ﬁrms operating nuclear re-
actors in Germany. Compared to the situation before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster, the life-span of nuclear reactors was substantially shortened. For example,
6almost half of the country’s reactors were immediately shutdown.
Second, we expect a positive impact on Germany’s renewable energies com-
panies. This includes ﬁrms operating in different sectors of the “green economy,”
i.e., ﬁrms that generate electricity from renewable energies as well as companies
that develop the related equipment (e.g., wind-powered turbines or photovoltaic
cells). The German reaction should ceteris paribus increase demand for the products
and services of these companies. Renewable energies are the sources of electricity
that will, at least in the medium run, have to replace nuclear energy. Whereas coal
and gas-ﬁred energy may replace nuclear energy in the short run, a further move
towards renewable energies appears inevitable in the medium run because carbon
dioxide emission targets are to be met.
Third, the relative magnitude of the impacts on Germany’s nuclear energy com-
panies and on Germany’s renewable energies companies is an empirical question. We
have no a priori expectation whether the two effects cancel each other out, or if one
of the two effects dominates the other. One possible scenario could be that other Eu-
ropean energy companies (nuclear and/or conventional electricity producers) step
in and deliver electricity to Germany in the future. If this is the case, the negative
impact on the shareholder wealth of German nuclear energy companies may exceed
the positive impact on German renewable energies companies.
Fourth, we similarly have no clear-cut a priori expectation about the share-
holder wealth effects on rivals in other European countries at the aggregate level.
As outlined above, the initial situation before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
was very different in European countries, and similarly different were the European
countries’ policy reactions. The overall effect at the aggregate European level is
therefore an empirical question. The German reaction may have furthermore trig-
gered some uncertainty about other countries’ policy responses, and investors may
have increasingly viewed similar reactions to the German reaction as likely.
Fifth, we expect heterogeneous shareholder wealth effects on competitors when
we separately analyze selected European countries because nuclear energy policies
and policy reactions substantially vary across countries. For example, the Swiss reac-
tion to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was relatively similar to the German
reaction. We therefore expect similar shareholder wealth effects on Swiss nuclear
energy companies. On the other hand, the French government did not reconsider
its nuclear energy policy. Hence, we do not expect negative shareholder wealth ef-
fects in France. On the contrary, if the French President is right and French nuclear
energy companies are candidates for selling electricity to Germany, these companies
may experience positive shareholder wealth effects. Similar gains may result for
Austrian companies for the reasons stated above.
73 Empirical Approach
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the event study methodology and highlight impor-
tant methodological challenges and their solutions. Second, we present the data and
our sample of ﬁrms as well as the event period that we investigate in this study.
3.1 Event Study Methodology
We measure the impact of the German reaction to the events in Japan on shareholder
wealth using the event study methodology. In this framework, abnormal returns are
the crucial measure to assess the impact of a given event. The general idea of this
measure is to isolate the event’s effect from any other general movements of the
market. The abnormal return of ﬁrm i on event date τ is deﬁned as the difference of
the realized return and the expected return given the absence of the event:
ARi,τ = Ri,τ − E[Ri,τ|Qi,τ−1] (1)
The expected return (henceforth referred to as normal return) is unconditional
on the event, but conditional on a separate information set (e.g., past returns). This
implies that the event study methodology will only yield reliable results if the event
of interest contains unanticipated information. In contrast to most event studies on
regulatory or legislative changes that are likely to suffer from anticipation effects (at
least to some extent), we can rule out the presence of such effects in our case. The
earthquake hit Japan unexpectedly, and similarly unexpected was the reaction of the
German government to these events.
To measure normal returns, we follow Brown and Warner (1985) and apply
the market model:
εi,τ = Ri,τ − (αi + βiRm,τ) (2)
where εi,τ is the abnormal return of ﬁrm i on day τ and Rm,τ is the return of the mar-
ket portfolio on day τ. The coefﬁcients αi and βi in equation (2) are OLS estimates
obtained from regressions of ﬁrm i’s daily returns on the market portfolio (and a
constant) over a period of 200 trading days ending 21 days before our ﬁrst event.
Daily average abnormal returns are then calculated for each day of the event







where N is the total number of ﬁrms in the sample.





We test the statistical signiﬁcance of (daily and cumulative) average abnormal
returns applying a cross-sectional t-test and the standardized residuals test suggested
by Patell (1976). Additionally, we apply the standardized cross-sectional residuals
test introduced by Boehmer et al. (1991). This test is robust towards event-induced
variance increases that potentially bias the other two tests. But in case of any non-
normality in abnormal returns, the former three parametric tests are poorly speci-
ﬁed. We therefore additionally apply the Corrado (1989) rank test in its modiﬁed
form suggested by Corrado and Zivney (1992).
The standard event study methodology and hypothesis tests rely on the as-
sumption of i.i.d. distributed market model residuals. However, this assumption is
most likely violated in our case since the events of interest occur during the same
calendar time period for all ﬁrms, and these ﬁrms are in the same industry (the
energy industry). Binder (1985a,b) surveys the literature of the event parameter
approach which addresses the problem of contemporaneous correlation in market
model residuals. The ﬁrst step is to parameterize individual abnormal returns by the
inclusion of dummy variables in equation (2):
Ri,τ = αi + βiRm,τ +
τ2 X
t=τ1
δi,tDt + εi,τ (5)
where Dt equals one during the event period of interest and zero otherwise.
Instead of an OLS estimation of each ﬁrm’s market model equation, the system
of market model equations is jointly estimated applying Zellner’s (1962) famous
seemingly unrelated regressions approach (henceforth referred to as SUR):

     
 

R1,τ = α1 + β1Rm,τ +
Pτ2
t=τ1 δ1,tDt + ε1,τ
. . .
Ri,τ = αi + βiRm,τ +
Pτ2
t=τ1 δi,tDt + εi,τ
. . .
RN,τ = αN + βNRm,τ +
Pτ2
t=τ1 δN,tDt + εN,τ






The joint estimation of the system of market model equations yields abnormal
return estimates and standard errors which are numerically equivalent to the esti-
mates derived from OLS regressions of the individual equations. Thus, there are no
efﬁciency gains from using the SUR estimator. The advantage of SUR over OLS lies
9in the construction of hypothesis tests. The null hypothesis of no average abnormal
returns can be tested in this framework by testing linear constraints on the coef-
ﬁcients δi,t while explicitly allowing for contemporaneous correlation in the error
terms. A single parameter restriction is then sufﬁcient to mimic the null hypothesis





δi,t = 0 (7)
Although different test statistics are available to test joint hypotheses in the
SUR framework, most statistics suffer from poor small sample properties and are
biased against the null hypothesis.6 We therefore only apply a standard Wald-Test.
In addition to abnormal returns we compute abnormal trading volume applying
a simple constant mean methodology. The average daily trading volume for each
individual ﬁrm is estimated over the period of 200 trading days ending 21 days
before our ﬁrst event. Following Brav and Gompers (2003) we correct for outliers
by setting values outside the 99% quantile to the median value. Assuming semi-
strong form market efﬁciency we expect that the abnormal trading volume is close
to zero over the pre- and post-event period, but that it signiﬁcantly increases during
the event period.
3.2 Data, Sample Selection, and Event Period
In this section, we provide a description of the sample and event date selection pro-
cess. To quantify the impact of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and the sub-
sequent unique German reaction, we consider the four large energy suppliers domi-
nating the German market as well as renewable energies companies since we expect
opposite effects on these ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. Without the consideration of the EU’s
and Switzerland’s major electricity utilities and listed renewable energies compa-
nies we cannot sufﬁciently prove the uniqueness of the German reaction. Moreover,
we would neglect potential wealth transfers due to a change in the competitiveness
of German energy companies caused by the substantial shift in Germany’s nuclear
policy in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
To identify nuclear and conventional energy companies, we apply the follow-
ing criteria throughout our analysis. First, we only consider listed companies that
are domiciled in the respective country. Second, we include companies whose last
annual ﬁnancial statement reports that at least 50% of their turnover is from nu-
clear and/or conventional electricity generation. We consider oil, gas and coal as
conventional sources of energy.
6See Binder (1985b) for a detailed discussion of the various tests.
10In the German case, we identify three companies out of the four major en-
ergy companies as listed companies that are domiciled in Germany: RWE, E.ON,
and EnBW. The fourth company, Vattenfall, is a private company fully owned by the
Swedish state. We therefore restrict our analysis of German nuclear and conven-
tional energy companies to the former three companies.7 Note that Vattenfall did
not operate any of the seven nuclear reactors that were immediately shutdown after
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
We use the constituents of the DAX Subsector All Renewable Energies Index to
identify companies operating in the “green economy.” According to the index rules
of the Deutsche Boerse Group, this index captures all listed companies generating
electricity from renewable energies as well as companies that develop the related
equipment (e.g., wind-powered turbines, photovoltaic cells, biogas plants). The in-
dex (as of February 2011) consists of 38 members. We exclude two companies that
are listed, but not domiciled in Germany. Furthermore, we exclude one company
that has an insufﬁcient number of observed returns over the estimation window.8
We moreover consider the EU’s and Switzerland’s major electricity utilities,
i.e., nuclear and conventional energy companies, as well as listed renewable ener-
gies companies. Our sample therefore additionally includes companies domiciled in
France, UK, Italy, Spain, Austria, Switzerland, the Benelux, and Nordic countries.
These countries’ energy sectors are not directly affected by the German reaction,
but potentially beneﬁt from a permanent shutdown of the German nuclear reactors.
The subsample of major electricity utilities consists of 13 companies. Additionally,
we identify 25 listed companies operating in the “green economy” whose business
activities are comparable to the constituents of the DAX Subsector All Renewable
Energies Index.9
Before we can test the impact of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and
of the German reaction on shareholder wealth, we need to identify the events that
possibly contain substantial new information. The events that comprise our event
window are listed in Table 1. We deﬁne the day of the terrible earthquake and the
subsequent tsunami in Japan (March 11, 2011) as “day zero” for our analysis.
Table 1 about here
The estimation period for the regression of the market model equations is based
on a period of 200 trading days ending 21 days before day zero. The stock mar-
7We also perform our analysis when we additionally exclude EnBW. The share of their stocks in
free ﬂoat is relatively low, but our results remain virtually the same.
8Since renewable energies companies potentially suffer from non-synchronous trading, we addi-
tionally estimate the market model applying the Scholes and Williams (1977) approach. Our results
are robust towards the choice of the estimation method.
9We follow the categorization of the STOXX Europe Sector indices using the Industry Classiﬁcation
Benchmark, ICB to identify appropriate and comparable companies.
11ket and accounting data for this study were obtained from ThomsonReuters Datas-
tream.10 We use the CDAX Index to estimate the market model’s parameters for each
company of both German subsamples. The CDAX Index is an equal-weighted index
that reﬂects the price developments of all German listed companies across the major
market segments Prime Standard and General Standard. Parameter estimations for
the two remaining subsamples are based on the Stoxx Europe 600 Index that rep-
resents companies with large, intermediate and small market capitalization in the
European countries included in our sample.
4 Results
After the tsunami hit the Japanese coast on March 11, 2011 (Friday), the Japanese
Prime Minister declared the nuclear emergency status. Germany’s reversal of its
nuclear policy was announced on March 14, 2011 (Monday), i.e., on the next trading
day. These events were completely unexpected by ﬁnancial markets. Hence, the
following event study results focus solely on the market reactions of share prices on
March 11, 2011 (τ = 0), on March 14, 2011 (τ = 1), and during the subsequent
time period of 20 trading days.
4.1 Shareholder Wealth Effects in Germany
Table 2 and Figure 1 show the market impact of the Japanese disaster and of the
German policy reaction on the German nuclear and conventional energy industry as
well as on the German renewable energies industry. We do not observe an immediate
reaction on the day of the earthquake, but it comes at no surprise that the event
day abnormal return (AAR1) is highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level and amounts to
–3.27% for the three major German nuclear and conventional energy companies
RWE, E.ON, and EnBW. In addition, the market reaction of the 35 constituents of
the DAX Subsector All Renewable Energies Index on this event day is positive, highly
signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, and adds up to 11.62%. These ﬁgures corroborate our
ﬁrst two hypotheses and furthermore indicate that ﬁnancial markets incorporate the
new information released by the Japanese and German governments very quickly.
Table 2 and Figure 1 about here
Table 2 and Figure 2 also take a closer look at the actual wealth gains and losses
the events under scrutiny have caused. For this purpose, we analyze the evolution
of total shareholder wealth, measured by the market capitalization, of the three
10Daily stock and index returns are calculated applying the concept of total shareholder return.
12major German nuclear and conventional energy companies as well as of the German
renewable energies companies.
Figure 2 about here
Column 7 of Table 2 shows that a total value of A C 4.405 billion is lost on the
event day in the German nuclear and conventional energy sector. In contrast, the
total wealth gains in the renewable energies sector amount to A C 1.105 billion on that
day. These results indicate that although we observe substantially higher abnormal
returns for the renewable energies industry compared to the abnormal returns in
the nuclear and conventional energy sector, the total shareholder wealth gains in
the renewable energies sector do not compensate for the huge losses in the nuclear
and conventional energy sector.
To investigate this further, we also look at the cumulative average abnormal
returns (CAARτ1,τ2) in both industries over different post-event time periods. The
empirical pattern described above on the event day remains virtually the same if we
look at the post-event period up to 20 trading days after the event. Therefore, we
can infer that the market is semi-strong form efﬁcient as all information is already
captured in security prices on the event day.
Table 3 about here
In Table 3, we observe the following signiﬁcantly negative cumulative average
abnormal returns in the German nuclear and conventional energy industry in the af-
termath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster: CAAR1,10 = –3.86%; CAAR1,20 =
–3.50%. During the 20 trading days after the German reaction to the Japanese
events, a total shareholder value of A C 2.078 billion is destroyed in the nuclear and
conventional energy industry. On the other hand, cumulative average abnormal re-
turns in the German renewable energies increase over time and are signiﬁcantly
positive at conventional levels in all sub-periods: CAAR1,10 = 17.51%; CAAR1,20 =
17.89%. Over the total post-event period the shareholder wealth gains in the renew-
able energies sector amount to A C 1.887 billion.
In summary, the above presented German results on the impact of the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear disaster and of the German policy response in the aftermath suggest a
wealth transfer from the nuclear and conventional energy industry to the renewable
energies sector. The combined wealth effect of both industries in Germany is nega-
tive and amounts to A C 0.191 billion over the entire post-event period of 20 trading
days.
An additional question is whether anybody else beneﬁts from the German re-
action. To answer this question, we investigate the policy and market reactions in
the nuclear and conventional energy industry as well as in the renewable energies
13industry in other European countries, and in particular in countries which are in
geographic proximity to Germany. Firms located in these countries could potentially
provide the electricity that Germany would need in case its own electricity supply
would not be sufﬁcient in the future.
4.2 Shareholder Wealth Effects in Europe
First, we look at the industries’ reaction in Europe as a whole. Table 4 and Figure 3
exhibit the abnormal returns and the evolution of the market capitalization during
the event period of 20 trading days for major European electricity utilities and re-
newable energies ﬁrms. The average abnormal return of the German competitors in
the nuclear and conventional energy industry on the event day (τ = 1) is signiﬁcant
and slightly negative with –0.86%. The total loss in shareholder value amounts to
A C –5.567 billion on that day. The market reaction of the German competitors in
the European renewable energies sector is insigniﬁcant and adds up to 1.26% which
represents a total wealth gain of A C 663 million.
Table 4 and Figure 3 about here
We also investigate in more detail the European market reactions in both indus-
tries over different post-event time periods (up to 20 trading days after the event).
It seems likely that only during the course of the post-event period, it becomes clear
if the German competitors in the nuclear industry beneﬁt from the decision of the
German government, or if they lose due to the fact that European governments in
general reassess their nuclear energy strategies.
Table 5 depicts the cumulative average abnormal returns in the post-event pe-
riod in the European nuclear and conventional energy industry as well as in the
renewable energies industry. All cumulative average abnormal returns in the differ-
ent sub-periods for the nuclear and conventional energy ﬁrms are slightly positive
and insigniﬁcant, suggesting that there seems to be no impact of the Fukushima Dai-
ichi nuclear disaster on the European nuclear and conventional energy industry as a
whole (CAAR1,10 = 0.90%; CAAR1,20 = 0.71%). However, over the entire post-event
period the industry gains in total A C 5.924 billion in terms of market capitalization.
The effect on the European (ex-Germany) renewable energies sector is pre-
dominantly insigniﬁcant. Although the effects for a period of 10 trading days are
signiﬁcant, they diminish over time and become insigniﬁcant if measured over the
entire event period of 20 trading days. Whereas their German competitors experi-
ence a shareholder gain of A C 1.887 billion during the entire event period, the Euro-
pean (ex-Germany) renewable energies sector gain A C 1.102 billion in the aftermath
of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
14Table 5 about here
Overall, the European market reaction (ex-Germany) to the events in Japan is
predominantly insigniﬁcant. However, the European competitors of the German ma-
jor electricity utilities experience a total shareholder wealth gain of A C 5.924 billion
over the event period of 20 trading days. This indicates a wealth transfer from the
German nuclear and conventional energy industry not only to the German renewable
energies sector (A C 1.887 billion), but also to the European nuclear and conventional
energy industry. Moreover, we ﬁnd a substantial abnormal trading volume for the
European energy companies after the event. This indicates that investors react to the
new and unanticipated information in some way. It may be the case that opposing
effects for companies in different countries cancel each other out at the aggregate
European level.
To investigate whether such opposing effects are present, we analyze in a next
step the market reactions separately in selected European countries. Heterogenous
impacts may be present due to different policy reactions in these countries.
4.3 Shareholder Wealth Effects in Selected European Countries
Figure 4 displays the shareholder wealth effects in four European countries.11 We
observe heterogeneous effects across France, Italy, Switzerland and Austria, which
can be linked to the countries’ reactions, energy policies and other interventions.
Figure 4 about here
French ﬁrms in the nuclear and conventional energy industry exhibit a sig-
niﬁcantly negative average abnormal return of –2.11% on the day of the German
reaction. This negative impact increases over time; and the cumulative average ab-
normal returns amount to –5.56% over the entire post-event period of 20 trading
days. These results are likely related to the French uncertainty in the aftermath of
the nuclear disaster. On the one hand, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy as-
sured that “Japan’s nuclear crisis would not change French policy on nuclear power”
(Bloomberg; March 17, 2011), but on the other hand the French nuclear regulator
regarded “reactor safety (as) fairly satisfactory” (Bloomberg; March 30, 2011).
We observe only a small positive reaction on the event day for Austrian compa-
nies (0.91%). However, the Austrian market reaction of conventional energy ﬁrms
becomes substantially positive as well as statistically and economically signiﬁcant
afterwards (CAAR1,10 = 15.59%; CAAR1,20 = 15.68%). These ﬁgures indicate that
investors expect Austrian conventional energy ﬁrms to beneﬁt from the German pol-
icy reaction and corroborate our hypothesis stated above.
11Detailed results and hypothesis tests for these countries are available from the authors.
15The stock price reaction of Swiss conventional energy companies is signiﬁcantly
negative and in the longer run even stronger than that of their German counterparts.
On the event day we observe a signiﬁcant negative abnormal return of –3.82%.
Over the entire post-event period of 20 trading days, cumulative average abnormal
returns remarkably increase and amount –15.98%. This is both statistically and eco-
nomically signiﬁcant. This result conﬁrms our hypothesis about shareholder wealth
effects in Switzerland in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster,
even though the magnitude of the effects is unexpectedly large.
The share price of Italian conventional energy ﬁrms hardly reacted in the af-
termath of the Japanese events and the German reaction (0.22% on the event day;
CAAR1,20 = –0.92%). This comes as no surprise as Italy has no nuclear power plants.
In summary, the above results show that the market has heterogeneous expec-
tations about which country’s nuclear and/or conventional energy industry will gain
or lose in the aftermath of the German reaction. We observe that Austrian conven-
tional energy ﬁrms seem to beneﬁt from the German reaction, Italian ﬁrms seem to
be unaffected, and Swiss and French ﬁrms seem to lose.
5 Robustness Check: United States
To assess the robustness of our empirical results, we investigate the shareholder
wealth effects on nuclear and conventional energy companies in the United States.
This analysis can be viewed as a “placebo” test assessing the validity of our approach
as the United States did not reconsider their energy policy in the aftermath of the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Furthermore and importantly, we are not aware
of any channel through which the reaction of the German government could have
affected the shareholder wealth of United States’ energy companies. We therefore
expect no effect in this part of our analysis.
After the shocking events in Japan, the United States did not reconsider their
nuclear energy policy. In a press brieﬁng of the White House on March 14, 2011—
the day when the German government announced the policy change—the Deputy
Secretary of Energy, Dan Poneman, said that “each event as it occurs is taken into
account, but we do not sort of change from day to day our overall approach to the
desire to diversify our overall energy posture” (The White House, 2011). The United
States’ government continued to take the same stance during the subsequent weeks,
although it announced a comprehensive safety review by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRA) for the country’s 104 operating nuclear reactors on March 23,
2011. One week later (March 30, 2011), the President of the United States, Barack
Obama, assured in his “Energy Security Speech” that nuclear energy has important
potential for increasing the country’s electricity without adding carbon dioxide to the
16atmosphere—subject to rigorous safety standards. The results of the comprehensive
safety review by the NRA were published on May 13, 2011. The review did not
ﬁnd any problems at nuclear reactors in the United States that would threaten their
safety. In sum, there are no events that we expect to result in substantial shareholder
wealth effects on nuclear and conventional energy companies in the United States.
To assess whether this is indeed the case, we apply the same methodology as
before. We also apply the same sample selection criteria as before. Our sample
therefore consists of nuclear and conventional energy companies which are listed
and domiciled in the United States. Each ﬁrm’s last annual ﬁnancial statement re-
ports that at least 50% of its turnover is from nuclear and/or conventional electricity
generation. As before, we consider oil, gas and coal as conventional sources of en-
ergy. Figure 5 and Table 6 display the resulting shareholder wealth effects on these
companies.
Figure 5 and Table 6 about here
The immediate market reaction of the United States’ conventional energy in-
dustry is negative, but it is neither economically nor statistically signiﬁcant on the
event day (–0.42%). We ﬁnd that cumulative average abnormal returns become in-
signiﬁcant for longer event windows, and they additionally change from negative to
positive values (CAAR1,20 = –1.53%; CAAR1,30 = –0.85%; CAAR1,40 = 1.88%). As hy-
pothesized above, the shareholder wealth of nuclear and conventional energy com-
panies in the United States appears unaffected in the aftermath of the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear disaster. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the validity of our approach.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the shareholder wealth effects on electricity companies in Ger-
many and in Europe in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. The
unique and unexpected German reaction to the shocking events in Japan allows us
to apply the event study methodology. Although it appears that event studies are
under-used and on the decline even in their traditional ﬁelds of application (eco-
nomics and ﬁnance, see Snowberg et al., 2011), we can rule out the problems this
approach typically suffers from. Most importantly, we can exclude any anticipation
effects as the probability of such an event was overwhelmingly judged as being es-
sentially zero—or, in the words of Taleb (2007), the event came close to discovering
a “black swan.” Similarly unexpected was the German reaction. Only a couple of
months earlier, the same government had basically reverted the shutdown strategy
of the previous governments. The change in Germany’s nuclear energy policy that
we explore thus came literally overnight.
17From a conceptual point of view, our results indicate that in our case, new
information is immediately priced in the stock markets. Our results show a remark-
ably strong effect on our event day; and this effect generally persists throughout the
entire event period. This is not very common in event studies and makes us con-
ﬁdent that the German reaction indeed represents an unanticipated intervention.
Although this is a prerequisite for the event study approach to generate unbiased
results, it nevertheless appears to be rarely fulﬁlled in this manner.
From a policy-oriented point of view, our ﬁndings indicate that the German re-
action has resulted in a wealth transfer from nuclear energy companies to renewable
energies companies. We moreover ﬁnd that the joint market capitalization of Ger-
man ﬁrms in both sectors has decreased, but the amount of this combined decrease
is small. We moreover detect non-negligible effects on nuclear energy companies in
other European countries. Importantly, the latter effects exhibit a substantial degree
of heterogeneity across countries, which can be linked to the respective nuclear en-
ergy policies. One noticeable exception is probably the case of France. In stark con-
trast to “popular wisdom” (put forward for instance by the French President Nicolas
Sarcozy), investors in the stock markets do not seem to value the perspective that
French nuclear reactors may export electricity to Germany in the future. Alterna-
tively, they attach a relatively low probability to such a scenario. However, investors
appear to share the view of Austrian power plant operators who were quoted that
they expect increasing electricity prices, the utilization of previously unused power
plant capacity, and higher proﬁts. Our results indicate substantial wealth gains of
Austrian ﬁrms that are very likely caused by the German policy change.
Our paper therefore highlights important economic impacts of the nuclear dis-
aster in Japan which are channeled through the unique and unexpected German
reaction to these shocking events. However, we want to clearly point out the limi-
tations of our analysis. First, we focus on shareholder wealth effects. Therefore, we
disregard—at least in principle—the social beneﬁts of the German reaction. Such
positive effects which are not incorporated in our outcome measure may include re-
ductions in morbidity or premature mortality, increased land values after the cleanup
of hazardous waste sites, or any other social beneﬁt associated with the shutdown
of nuclear power plants (Palmer et al., 1995). For example, employment effects may
also result. We are not able to investigate these dimensions at this stage. This does,
however, not rule out that such effects may be present. Second, and related to the
previous point, our analysis only considers the short-term shareholder wealth effects
of the German reaction. At this point in time, we are agnostic about the long-term
effects. In general, these effects on German ﬁrms are uncertain because they may for
example react with strategic partnerships to rivals in other European countries (e.g.,
joint ventures such as RWE in the Netherlands) and, more generally, with increased
international cooperation. German ﬁrms may also have increased incentives to in-
18vest in “green” technology, and such investments can have important effects in the
long run. Third, our paper does not explicitly analyze the effects of “going green”
on electricity prices, carbon dioxide emissions, or the security of energy supplies.12
These factors are only included in our analysis in as far as they are priced in the stock
markets. Fourth, we only consider the shareholder wealth effects on listed compa-
nies. This has the drawback that our results for renewable energies companies are
likely lower bounds as many of this sector’s companies are small- and medium-sized
ﬁrms which are not (yet) listed on the stock market.
Despite of these limitations, our study shows that “going green” is not necessar-
ily associated with substantially large detrimental effects for the economy. Although
we ﬁnd evidence for a wealth transfer from nuclear and conventional energy compa-
nies to renewable energies companies in Germany, these two opposing effects cancel
each other almost completely out. The overall loss in terms of the joint market cap-
italization of companies who are affected by Germany’s policy change is relatively
small. One should, however, be cautious when generalizing from this result. It is
very likely related to the speciﬁc German context. For example, renewable ener-
gies have been subsidized in Germany for quite some time and there are already a
number of established companies operating in this sector of the country’s economy.
Germany was therefore relatively well prepared for the reversal of its nuclear energy
policy. Nevertheless, the abrupt phase-out in response to the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear disaster could not be expected.
12Kemfert and Traber (2011) investigate these dimensions for Germany.
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21Table 1: Important Events in Selected Countries.












3/11/2011 0 Earthquake and tsunami in
Japan, Prime Minister declares
nuclear emergency status
3/14/2011 1 Reports of excessive radiation
levels, nuclear meltdown being
underway
Germany calls independent in-
quiry to study nuclear plant fu-
ture and sets three month mora-
torium for nuclear extension
Switzerland stops plans for three
additional nuclear reactors and
announces safety checks on ex-
isting reactors
3/15/2011 2 German pre-1980 nuclear plants
to be halted, Merkel says
3/16/2011 3
3/17/2011 4 Merkel against closing all nu-
clear power plants in Germany;
German nuclear moratorium is
legal, Merkel says
Nicolas Sarkozy assures that
Japan’s nuclear crisis would not
change French nuclear energy
policy
3/18/2011 5
3/21/2011 6 Japanese government an-
nounces permanent shutdown




3/24/2011 9 Italy approves a moratorium on
the future construction of nu-
clear power plants
3/25/2011 10
3/28/2011 11 Merkel says her personal view of
nuclear power has changed after
Fukushima
3/29/2011 12 FDP in favor of leaving eight
German nuclear power plants
closed
3/30/2011 13 French nuclear regulator re-
gards reactor safety as fairly
satisfactory
3/31/2011 14








22Figure 1: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Abnormal Trading Volume,
Germany.
(a) Nuclear/Conventional Energy Companies
(b) Renewable Energies Subsample
Notes: The abnormal return is calculated using the market model as the normal return. Abnormal volume is calculated
as described in Brav and Gompers (2003).
23Table 2: Cumulative/Daily Average Abnormal Returns and Aggregate Market Capi-
talization, Germany.
Event Time
Nuclear/Convent. Energy Companies Renewable Energies Subsample Total
CAAR−20,τ AARτ MCAPτ CAAR−20,τ AARτ MCAPτ MCAPτ
–20 –0.1490% –0.1490% 89,982.07 1.3616% 1.3616% 8,908.37 98,890.44
–19 –0.3709% –0.2219% 89,918.92 2.0115% 0.6498% 9,051.17 98,970.09
–18 –0.6629% –0.2920% 89,525.07 1.2792% –0.7322% 9,048.30 98,573.37
–17 –1.4769% –0.8140% 88,659.04 1.5302% 0.2509% 9,176.39 97,835.43
–16 –0.9341% 0.5428% 89,102.00 2.4256% 0.8955% 9,316.68 98,418.68
–15 –0.7547% 0.1794% 89,329.58 2.4102% –0.0155% 9,460.78 98,790.36
–14 –0.4106% 0.3441% 88,862.51 2.4463% 0.0361% 9,317.73 98,180.24
–13 –0.5044% –0.0938% 88,518.75 0.6352% –1.8111% 9,204.02 97,722.77
–12 –0.2594% 0.2450% 87,758.07 0.4872% –0.1480% 8,996.61 96,754.68
–11 –1.8483% –1.5889% 85,633.61 1.6110% 1.1238% 9,077.87 94,711.48
–10 –2.4024% –0.5541% 85,416.55 3.1897% 1.5787% 9,260.86 94,677.41
–9 –3.0157% –0.6133% 85,309.79 2.3517% –0.8380% 9,217.60 94,527.39
–8 –3.8225% –0.8068% 84,085.51 3.3938% 1.0421% 9,142.44 93,227.95
–7 –3.6810% 0.1414% 83,843.99 2.8568% –0.5370% 9,003.00 92,846.99
–6 –3.6734% 0.0076% 84,009.62 2.5985% –0.2583% 8,896.96 92,906.58
–5 –3.8614% –0.1879% 83,331.82 4.1262% 1.5277% 8,925.61 92,257.43
–4 –3.8015% 0.0598% 83,415.40 4.0032% –0.1230% 8,798.54 92,213.94
–3 –3.5270% 0.2745% 83,585.30 4.5635% 0.5604% 8,871.90 92,457.20
–2 –4.2174% –0.6903% 82,571.00 4.9051% 0.3415% 8,839.83 91,410.83
–1 –3.3078% 0.9096% 82,766.06 2.5608% –2.3442% 8,616.41 91,382.47
0 –2.3539% 0.9539% 83,231.94 1.0430% –1.5178% 8,416.16 91,648.10
1 –5.6217% –3.2677% 78,827.13 12.1129% 11.0699% 9,521.60 88,348.73
2 –7.0874% –1.4657% 75,873.72 23.7698% 11.6569% 10,256.50 86,130.22
3 –6.2843% 0.8031% 75,786.22 18.3865% –5.3833% 9,396.45 85,182.67
4 –5.7460% 0.5384% 77,233.01 19.5699% 1.1834% 9,823.80 87,056.81
5 –6.5578% –0.8118% 76,438.29 18.6309% –0.9390% 9,620.87 86,059.16
6 –6.5369% 0.0209% 77,332.28 17.1087% –1.5222% 9,755.63 87,087.91
7 –6.3333% 0.2036% 77,188.91 16.7993% –0.3094% 9,589.50 86,778.41
8 –6.2039% 0.1294% 77,455.41 18.7127% 1.9134% 9,881.01 87,336.42
9 –6.3251% –0.1212% 78,043.31 16.8067% –1.9060% 9,802.30 87,845.61
10 –6.2137% 0.1115% 78,167.95 17.9848% 1.1781% 9,934.62 88,102.57
11 –6.1904% 0.0233% 78,035.58 22.4525% 4.4677% 10,533.71 88,569.29
12 –6.5220% –0.3316% 77,596.46 21.8639% –0.5886% 10,460.72 88,057.18
13 –5.8226% 0.6994% 79,097.19 21.0533% –0.8106% 10,491.54 89,588.73
14 –5.4345% 0.3881% 79,098.43 19.8918% –1.1615% 10,502.55 89,600.98
15 –5.7859% –0.3515% 79,622.80 19.1213% –0.7705% 10,467.07 90,089.87
16 –5.2448% 0.5412% 80,064.23 20.7715% 1.6502% 10,635.38 90,699.61
17 –4.6424% 0.6023% 80,665.15 20.7004% –0.0711% 10,592.22 91,257.37
18 –4.9136% –0.2712% 80,746.92 19.4648% –1.2356% 10,502.98 91,249.90
19 –5.3447% –0.4311% 80,831.93 19.0114% –0.4534% 10,416.45 91,248.38
20 –5.8529% –0.5082% 81,153.66 18.3759% –0.6355% 10,303.38 91,457.04
Notes: Aggregate market capitalization in A C million. For companies with multiple class of stock we report the consolidated
market capitalization.
24Figure 2: Daily Market Capitalization, Germany.
(a) Nuclear/Conventional Energy Companies
(b) Renewable Energies Subsample
Notes: For companies with multiple class of stock we report the consolidated market capitalization.
25Table 3: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Related Test Statistics, Germany.
CAARτ1,τ2 +/– t-Test Patell Z Boehmer Corrado Wald
et al. Rank (SUR)
Panel A: Nuclear/Conventional Energy Companies
(0;0) 0.95% 2:1 1.6329* 1.8780* 1.0032 1.2521 1.74
(1;1) –3.27% 0:3 –2.1612** –6.1855*** –2.0674** –1.8665* 19.95***
(0;10) –2.91% 0:3 –2.2925** –1.6343* –2.1326** — —
(0;20) –2.55% 1:2 –1.0043 –0.5744 –0.9219 — —
(1;10) –3.86% 0:3 –2.0875** –2.3080* –2.0440** — —
(1;20) –3.50% 0:3 –1.7778* –1.0086 –2.5171** — —
Panel B: Renewable Energies Subsample
(0;0) –1.52% 14:21 –2.3430** –2.5815*** –1.7339* –1.1624 2.24
(1;1) 11.07% 29:6 5.2629*** 22.2902*** 5.6717*** 4.2028*** 142.00***
(0;10) 16.06% 26:9 3.6390*** 9.6775*** 4.8911*** — —
(0;20) 16.43% 27:8 3.4502*** 7.6831*** 4.9978*** — —
(1;10) 17.51% 26:9 4.0835*** 10.8170*** 5.2925*** — —
(1;20) 17.89% 27:8 3.9129*** 8.3447*** 5.3840*** — —
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
26Figure 3: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Abnormal Trading Volume,
Europe (ex Germany).
(a) Nuclear/Conventional Energy Companies
(b) Renewable Energies Subsample
Notes: The abnormal return is calculated using the market model as the normal return. Abnormal volume is calculated
as described in Brav and Gompers (2003).
27Table 4: Cumulative/Daily Average Abnormal Returns and Aggregate Market Capi-
talization, Europe (ex Germany).
Event Time
Nuclear/Convent. Energy Companies (EU) Renewable Energies Subsample (EU) Total (EU)
CAAR−20,τ AARτ MCAPτ CAAR−20,τ AARτ MCAPτ MCAPτ
–20 0.0991% 0.0991% 279,850.60 –0.3674% –0.3674% 9,976.82 289,827.42
–19 –0.1290% –0.2281% 280,090.83 0.1537% 0.5211% 10,102.62 290,193.45
–18 –0.3881% –0.2591% 279,411.83 0.9903% 0.8366% 10,098.34 289,510.17
–17 –0.0135% 0.3747% 281,635.20 1.7744% 0.7842% 10,100.76 291,735.96
–16 0.0655% 0.0789% 284,194.55 0.1694% –1.6051% 10,035.60 294,230.15
–15 0.1868% 0.1214% 283,292.24 0.4726% 0.3032% 10,054.05 293,346.29
–14 –0.3128% –0.4996% 279,340.76 –0.0692% –0.5417% 9,930.37 289,271.13
–13 –0.2277% 0.0850% 277,209.67 –1.0376% –0.9685% 9,962.28 287,171.95
–12 –0.4910% –0.2633% 274,310.16 –0.0074% 1.0302% 9,826.11 284,136.27
–11 0.9291% 1.4202% 277,494.66 0.6097% 0.6171% 9,902.01 287,396.67
–10 0.7526% –0.1765% 279,695.21 0.3051% –0.3045% 10,194.58 289,889.79
–9 1.2633% 0.5107% 282,606.01 –0.9063% –1.2114% 10,388.89 292,994.90
–8 1.1244% –0.1390% 278,877.27 –0.9042% 0.0021% 10,157.36 289,034.63
–7 0.2453% –0.8791% 275,712.65 –1.5047% –0.6005% 10,104.02 285,816.67
–6 –0.1157% –0.3610% 275,505.13 –1.5948% –0.0901% 10,074.76 285,579.89
–5 –0.2668% –0.1511% 273,206.34 1.1969% 2.7918% 9,993.83 283,200.17
–4 0.2236% 0.4905% 272,024.49 2.2479% 1.0510% 10,021.62 282,046.11
–3 0.1727% –0.0510% 272,807.85 0.3485% –1.8994% 9,997.16 282,805.01
–2 0.3478% 0.1751% 272,927.44 0.1443% –0.2042% 10,155.17 283,082.61
–1 0.6361% 0.2883% 271,069.76 –1.1483% –1.2926% 9,941.50 281,011.26
0 0.4704% –0.1657% 268,812.97 –1.7566% –0.6084% 9,772.70 278,585.67
1 –0.3867% –0.8571% 263,246.28 –0.4996% 1.2571% 10,436.15 273,682.43
2 0.1586% 0.5453% 259,949.82 1,1815% 1.6811% 10,559,57 270,509.39
3 0.9977% 0.8391% 258,489.20 2.7937% 1.6122% 10,472.62 268,961.82
4 0.3920% –0.6057% 261,732.04 3.1033% 0.3095% 10,766.77 272,498.81
5 0.4732% 0.0812% 261,119.44 3.1774% 0.0741% 11,012.93 272,132.37
6 0.4896% 0.0163% 267,775.35 1.7476% –1.4298% 10,800.46 278,575.81
7 0.4242% –0.0654% 267,822.74 1.6216% –0.1260% 10,735.59 278,558.33
8 0.3202% –0.1041% 269,662.52 2.1924% 0.5708% 10,892.16 280,554.68
9 0.6847% 0.3645% 272,291.93 1.8774% –0.3150% 11,050.03 283,341.96
10 1.3698% 0.6852% 272,091.22 3.1637% 1.2863% 11,144.35 283,235.57
11 1.7323% 0.3625% 272,942.83 3.8935% 0.7298% 11,663.95 284,606.78
12 2.1124% 0.3801% 275,262.99 2.7922% –1.1013% 11,450.16 286,713.15
13 2.5996% 0.4872% 279,650.86 2.6860% –0.1062% 11,659.23 291,310.09
14 2.9956% 0.3960% 278,100.75 2.4837% –0.2023% 11,711.81 289,812.56
15 2.3387% –0.6569% 278,301.97 1.4597% –1.0240% 11,630.53 289,932.50
16 2.4652% 0.1265% 279,599.94 2.0278% 0.5680% 11,780.07 291,380.01
17 1.7042% –0.7610% 276,655.80 1.5874% –0.4404% 11,401.56 288,057.36
18 1.4015% –0.3026% 275,089.85 0.8071% –0.7803% 11,248.02 286,337.87
19 1.1150% –0.2865% 273,185.23 1.5465% 0.7394% 10,880.59 284,065.82
20 1.1788% 0.0638% 274,736.49 1.8096% 0.2632% 10,874.73 285,611.22
Notes: Aggregate market capitalization in A C million. For companies with multiple class of stock we report the consolidated
market capitalization.
28Table 5: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Related Test Statistics, Europe
(ex Germany).
CAARτ1,τ2 +/– t-Test Patell Z
Boehmer Corrado Wald
et al. Rank (SUR)
Panel A: Nuclear/Conventional Energy Companies (Europe ex Germany)
(0;0) –0.17% 6:7 –0.6165 –0.5320 –0.3932 –0.3354 0.56
(1;1) –0.86% 5:8 –1.1604 –2.8060*** –1.1853 –1.0697 1.05
(0;10) 0.73% 7:6 0.2932 0.7270 0.3336 — —
(0;20) 0.54% 8:5 0.1591 0.6840 0.3062 — —
(1;10) 0.90% 7:6 0.3615 0.9307 0.4086 — —
(1;20) 0.71% 8:5 0.2068 0.8198 0.3563 — —
Panel B: Renewable Energies Subsample (Europe ex Germany)
(0;0) –0.61% 12:13 –0.5582 –0.2673 –0.1516 –0.9099 0.38
(1;1) 1.26% 18:7 1.2460 2.7993** 1.5005 2.3294*** 1.70
(0;10) 4.31% 16:9 1.9401** 2.3051** 2.0369** — —
(0;20) 2.96% 16:9 0.7808 1.0573 0.9456 — —
(1;10) 4.92% 16:9 2.1789** 2.5022** 2.2027** — —
(1;20) 3.57% 15:10 0.8444 1.1431 0.8840 — —
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
29Figure 4: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of European (ex Germany) Nu-
clear/Conventional Energy Companies by Country.
Notes: The abnormal return is calculated using the market model as the normal return.
30Figure 5: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Abnormal Trading Volume,
Nuclear/Conventional Energy Companies in the United States.
Notes: The abnormal return is calculated using the market model as the normal return.
Table 6: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Related Test Statistics, Nu-
clear/Conventional Energy Companies in the United States.
CAARτ1,τ2 +/– t-Test Patell Z
Boehmer Corrado Wald
et al. Rank (SUR)
(0;0) –0.08% 7:16 –0.4469 –0.8353 –0.6647 –0.3815 0.41
(1;1) –0.42% 9:14 –1.5518 –2.6854*** –1.6371 –0.6159 1.83
(0;10) –2.73% 3:20 –3.5959*** –4.7438*** –4.3985*** — —
(0;20) –1.62% 7:16 –1.7733* –2.2015** –2.3818** — —
(0;30) –0.93% 8:15 –0.9018 –1.3815 –1.7436* — —
(0;40) 1.80% 12:11 1.3214 0.8780 1.0456 — —
(1;10) –2.65% 3:20 –3.8508*** –4.7112*** –4.5261*** — —
(1;20) –1.53% 7:16 –1.8743* –2.0691** –2.3611** — —
(1;30) –0.85% 8:15 –0.8849 –1.2518 –1.6554* — —
(1;40) 1.88% 14:9 1.5026 1.0210 1.2847 — —
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
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